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In the past decade, the concern over a hypothetical "population
explosion" has become an increasing preoccupation in growing segments
of the American public. Terms such as "standing-room-only-world,"
"demographic catastrophe,' "future doomsday," etc. have become common,
and the work of organizations such as Planned Parenthood, Zero Population
Growth, and countless other agencies has centered around this supposed
threat to continued human existence. Paul and Anne Ehrlich have set
forth the general position on "overpopulation" stating: "The explosive
growth of the human population is the most significant event in the past
million millenia. . . . Mankind itself may stand on the brink of
extinction; in its death throes it could take with it most of the other
passengers of Spaceship Earth. No geological event in a billion years
* * * has posed a threat to terrestrial life comparable to that of human
overpopulation." (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1970:cpl)
America's popular literature is similarly filled with such apocalyptical forebodings.
Joyce Brothers, in her advice column, is perhaps
more subtle than the Ehrlichs, but her position is clear. In reponse to
a question of a reader who wished to know whether having more than two
children was selfish, Brothers writes, "Perhaps . . . the threat of overpopulation continues to be a worldwide problem. If you are sure that you
and your husband could enthusiastically care for more than two, a larger
family may be right for you. But why not consider adopting an unwanted
child? . . . By adoption you could have the large family you want--and
at the same time have the satisfaction of knowing that you are contributing to the solution of a serious problem."
(Brothers, 1973:78)
Many other examples of society's concern with the question of
population could be cited, but the point has been made. There is little
question over the existence of a rampant population explosion, and most
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of the debate centers around possible actions which would stop it.
Understandably then, few professionals within the field of social
welfare have raised the issue as to whether overpopulation in America
is mythical or real. The actions of the profession over the past years
have assumed the "a priori" existence of the problem, and the profession's interest has revolved around discovering acceptable measures
for alleviating it.
This analysis challenges the assumption of such a population
explosion in American society. The authors realize that such a challenge
places them among a distinct minority of social scientists, but that is
the risk willingly taken, and an attempt will be made to buttress the
arguments with both historical and current data which argue that there
is no population explosion in American society.
The decline in America's fertility behavior since 1800 serves as a
useful starting point. Table 1 presents historical data relevant to the
number of children under 5 years of age per 1000 women in the prime
child-bearing years (ages 20-44).

Table 1
Number of Children Under 5 Years Old Per 1000
Women 20 to 44 Years Old by Race
1800-1960
Adjusted Number of Children per 1000 Women
Year

White

Black

1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960

1342
1358
1295
1145
1085
892
905
814
780
685
666
631
604
506
419
587
469

N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1087
1072
997
1090
930
845
736
608
554
513
706
543

Source:

Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times
to 1957. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C., 1960
Series B36-68:24. Data for 1960 and for women age 20-54
years are unadjusted and are taken from U.S. Census 1960,
Women by Children Under 5 Years Old PC (2)3C:l. Similar data
are not provided in 1970 Census.

The data for white women extends back to 1800, for black women to
1850. In both groups there has been large-scale drop in the number of
children. For white women the number has dropped from 1342 children per
1000 women in 1800 to 469 per 1000 in 1960; for black women the number
has fallen from 1087 per 1000 in 1850 to 543 in 1960. In scanning these
data, the reader may note the continual process of fertility decline
throughout American history, with the exception of the 1950-1960 data
which relate to the World War II baby boom. As will be noted momentarily,
the post 1960 data on birth patterns indicate that this temporary rise
lasted but a few years (1946-1957) and since then, the process of a longterm secular decline in fertility patterns has re-appeared. Consequently
this secular decline represents a transition from a large family structure
to a smaller one.
The data in Table 2 help illustrate the current trends in America's
birth rates which are now the lowest in our entire history surpassing
the previous low points which were recorded in the Depression. Table 2
shows that present birth rates have been steadily decreasing since the
In fact, the decline since 1957 has been
height of the baby boom (1957).
rather steep, from 25.2 to our present 1973 rate of 15.0 (see Table 2).
Table 2
Crude Birth Rates for the United States
for Selected Years (1910-1973)
Crude Birth Rate*

Year

30.1
29.5
27.7
25.1
21.3
18.7
19.4
20.5
23.9
24.9
25.1
25.2
24.5
24.3
23.8
23.5
22.6
21.9
21.2
19.6
18.5
17.9
17.6

1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
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1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
* Annual births

Source:

17.8
18.3
17.3
16.4
15.0

divided by mid-ear population divided by 1000.

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972 Table no. 8,
p. 10; also various Current Population Reports of U.S.
Census Bureau for post 1970 data

It should also be added that America's present population growth
rate is virtually below the replacement level. The fertility rate
necessary for replacement is 2.11 mean children and the rate for 1973
was 1.90. Hence, the possibility of stable, or even negative growth
(Schmerck, 1974:lff)
presents itself.
These data help explain some of the panic in demographic circles,
for the rate of 25.2 in 1957, if continued, would have meant that the
U.S. population in the year 2000 would have been over 400 million. One
"It is this proobserver, Valerie Dillon, discusses this as follows:
jection to which Americans are reacting today. What they haven't yet
realized is that a decline since 1957 brought birth rates to their lowest
(Dillon, 1972:4) Furthermore, the recent
point in American history."
decline in our birth rate in the past seven years have resulted in the
Census Bureau drastically lowering its estimates of our population in the
year 2000. Instead of earlier predictions of our future population at
approximately 400 million, the present forecast is in the vicinity of
260-280 million people.
These data on our current birth rate decline are complemented by
the data in Table 3 which illustrate the general fertility rate for the
nation for specific years since 1935. The general fertility rate is a
more powerful measure than the crude birth rate, and it helps amplify
the data presented in Tables 1 and 2 (see Table 3).
Table 3
General Fertility Rate* for the United States
for Selected Years (1935-1973)
General Fertility Rate

Year

77.2
79.9
85.9
106.1
118.7
121.4
123.0

1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1956
1957
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1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
* Annual births per

Source:

120.2
120.2
119.1
118.4
113.2
109.4
105.8
97.3
91.8
88.1
86.1
86.2
88.0
81.9
73.4
69.3
1000 females 15 to 44 years of age.

Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1972,
Table no. 8:10 and Statistical Abstracts . . . 1973,
Table no. 9:1l,also annual reports of National Center for
Health Statistics, Census Bureau provided the 1973 figure.

Analyzing these data-more closely, it can be noted that there is
general acceptance within demographic circles of the view that the levels
of fertility among various socioeconomic groups in American society are
converging, particularly in view of the noticeable declines in the fertility patterns of the lower-socioeconomic groups. This decline in the
fertility of the lower class in spite of the slight rise in the fertility
of the higher socioeconomic groups has had the impact of considerably
narrowing the historical social class fertility differentials.
(Matras, 1972:323)
The racial differences in American fertility patterns are also
converging. Currently (1970 data) black rates are higher than white rates,
but these differences are partly spurious, if one controls for level of
education. Thus, black fertility is greatest among women with low levels
of education, far more so than white womm in the same category.
But black
and white women with high school education have about the same level of
fertility. However, the fertility of black female college graduates is
far lower than white female graduates (1.4 mean children vs. 2.1 children
for white females).
(Matras, 1973:325)
How does one then explain these decreasing levels of fertility in our
population? Firstly, analyzing census data, it should be stressed that a
far larger proportion of our female population is remaining single than in
previous eras.
In 1970, 44% of women at age 21 were single, compared with
35% in 1960. Even more significant is the proportion of women (ages
35-54) with educations beyond college who never marry which, at present,
is approximately 19% (U.S. Census, 1970:Tables 1 and 4).
Also of
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importance is the later age of marriage for American females, and recent
information from the Census Bureau suggests not only that an increasing
number of American women will remain single, but the remainder will
marry at later ages than earlier age cohorts. (Panic, 1972:8). For
example, 38% of women in 20-24 age groups were single in 1973 compared
to 28% in 1960 (Birth Rates, 1974).
In discussing this "fertility
recession" Donald Bogue has said he "finds it impossible to foresee a
chain of developments other than the slow but steady decline of birth
rates. (Birth Rate, 1971:78)
Of equal importance is the number of American women favoring large
families and the data in Table 3 confirm that this number has dropped
considerably since 1967. The projection of a fertility decline is thus
supported by the fact of a decline in number of children wanted by
American women (see Table 4).
Table 4
Percentage of Women in Various Age Groups
Who Wanted Four or More Children 1967 and 1971*
Age Group

1967

1971

a)
b)
c)

21 - 29 years old
30 - 49 years old
50+

34
48
42

15
24
27

d)

Total

40%

23%

Source:

Gallup Poll, 1971; cited in V. Dillon, "Will the Real Population
Problem Please Stand Up?" East Brunswick, New Jersey: Bureau of
Family Life, Diocese of Trenton, 1972, p. 4.

*A Census Bureau Survey (June 1971] showed that the birth expectations of young married women declined from previous years. The average
number of total births expected by wives in the 18-39 age bracket was 2.8,
a decline from the 3.1 average reported in a similar survey in 1967; see
MORE: The Interfaces Between Population, Economic Growth and the Environment (Washington, D.C.: The League of Women Voters, 1972, p. 11). Other
data reported in Social Indicators 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1974) report that since 1965 the average number of
children expected by Black women (18-24 years) dropped from 3.4 to 2.4,
and from 3.1 to 2.2 for white women.
Consequently, the combination of these factors, more women remaining
single, more women marrying at later ages, the growing number of women
favoring smaller-sized families--suggest that American society is nowhere
near the demographic apocalypse portrayed by a number of respected
publicists. In view of these factors, it can be concluded that Malthusian
brinkmanship thinking can not be validated by current data.
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This decrease in fertility, if sustained, will have a profound
impact on America's population, particularly in the dependent age categories (under 15 and over E5).
Firstly, the nation will have proportionally fewer children *,nder 15 years of age than in earlier eras.
In 1970, for example, there were 15% fewer children than in 1960 in the
5 and under age category, and this trend will be accentuated in future
years. Secondly, the fertility decline implies a higher median age for
our population; in 1972 it was 28 and this will rise to 38 in the next
generation if the present birth rate is sustained in future years. This
consequently means that our death rate, which is now 9.4 per 1000 will
rise substantially, since the higher ages have higher mortality rates than
the lower ones. Thirdly, bv 1980 it can be expected that there will be
approximately 18% more people in the 65+ age category than in 1970.
Fourthly, in relation to our central cities, we can expect lower absolute
populations in 1980 than in 1970 because of high out-migration to the
suburban ring.
In spite of these factors, critics constantly argue that we are
still, as a nation, overpopulated and that the decline in the current
birth rate is of minor importance. Thus the nation should be very much
concerned with such factors as the future food production of America, the
high density so evident in the nation, the industrial pollution created
by large populations, etc. Again, it can be argued that these are
invalid arguments. Firstly, America's capacity to feed its existing
population cannot be seriously questioned. Until very recently a large

food surplus had been produced and the cost of merely storing the
surplus was staggering. Farmers have been paid, by way of federal
subsidy, simply not to grow foodl
The real problem here is not food
prdduction, but its distribution wherein means must be developed to
channel surplus food to those in the population who need it (inner city
residents, the aged, rural poor, etc.).
The internationally-noted
agricultural economist Colin Clark says that the U.S. population could
continue to increase at its present rate until the year 2000 and still
have large food surpluses.
(Dillon, 1972:4)
Secondly, the nation is far from overpopulated in relation to its

available land area. Table 5 compares America with other nations and
the data contained therein confirm that the United States is one of the
least densely populated countries with a density of 57 people per square
mile (see Table 5).

Table 5
Population Density of Selected Nations
Nation

Persons per Square Mile

Netherlands

985

Japan
West Germany
United Kingdom

710
627
590

Italy
India
France
China (mainland)
Indonesia
Greece
United States
U.S.S.R.
Source:

455
416
237
198
197
174
57
29

Bureau of Census, cited in MORE: The Interfaces Between
Population, Economic Growth and the Environment (Washington,
D.C.: The League of Women Voters, 1972).

Essentially, the difficulties here are not related to the density
of the nation as a whole, but rather are due to the distribution of our
210 million people. Of these 80% live on 10% of our land, 70% on 2% of
the land. Furthermore, a review of the data in Table 6 shows the growth
and change in our population distribution since 1950. These data
indicate that most of the recent population growth in American metropolitan areas has taken place in what sociologists call the urban "fringe."
In fact, since 1960 the population of central cities grew by six percent,
while the contiguous areas within metropolitan areas (SMSA) grew by
27 percent (see Table 6).
Table 6
Growth of the Suburban, Central City and Non-metropolitan
Population of the United States 1950 - 1970
RESIDENT POPULATION as of APRIL 1, 1970
Percent
of total

Total in Thousands
AREA CATEGORY
1950

1960

1970

1970

94,600
53,800

119,600
60,000

139,400
63,800

68.6
31.4

40,800
n.a.
n.a.

59,600
43,000
16,700

75,600
59,200
16,400

37.2
29.1
8.1

Non-metropolitan areas56,700
urban
n.a.
rural
n.a.

59,700
22,300
37,400

63,800
26,400
37,400

31.4
13.0
18.4

243 SMSAs
central cities
outside central
cities
urban
rural

Source:

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Pocket Data Book, U.S.A. 1971, Table 7,
p. 40 (revised for this study).

In addition, if this trend of concentration and centralization
continues, 50% of the nation's population will live in one or the other
of two huge urban regions one of which is the area encompassing the region
from Boston to Washington which will join the area running from Chicago

to Pittsburgh, the second of which is on the west coast of the United
States will include the area between San Francisco and San Diego,
California.
(MORE, 1972:12) Hence, the need for de-centralization of
these huge metropolitan areas is apparent. For those living in these
areas, it is understandable to see why they consider the United States
to be one of the most densely populated areas on earth! The population
density of New York's Manhattan Island, for example, in 1970, exceeded
67,000 persons per square mile.
(Statistical Abstracts, 1972:23, no. 22)
Donald Bogue has argued that the population of America could easily double
and it would help immensely if these metropolitan areas were more
decentralized.
Thirdly, the relationship between population growth and pollution
is complex since the American life style presupposes that a value on
material consumption and the resultant problems of this choice cannot be
simply blamed on population growth. It's just as logical to argue that
the amount of pollution can be better reduced by lower material consumption on the part of the nation than by lower fertility! Conrad
Tauber, former associate director of the U.S. Census Bureau, has stated
this in the following way:

The recent public concern with environmental problems has
often confused the element of population growth with the
consequence of the way in which we live. Economic and social
factors are more important than population growth in
threatening the quality of American life.
(MORE, 1972:20)
Also, the apocalyptical writers often equate lower population size with

economic growth in the nation.

Perhaps the opinion of the French demo-

grapher Sauvy might be useful in this respect for he argues that if
limiting population growth enriches a country then France should be the
richest on earth, since it attained population control long before the
other industrialized nations!
(Clark, 1946:276)
Hence, the arguments that the United States risks chaos because of
overcrowding, dwindling food potential, and irreversible atmospheric
pollution, etc. cannot be supported since the empirical data suggest

otherwise.

Yet why do these arguments constantly arise in discussions of

population phenomenon?

Why then do the advocates of population control,

whether it be via contraception, sterilization, abortion or euthanasia,
ignore the data which suggests that the United States can easily
accommodate increased population growth? Why are alternatives such as
re-distribution of population through in-migration, greater decentralization of urban centers, more equitable distribution of wealth and natural
resources, etc., consistently ignored in favor of emotional, even
hysterical approaches?
These questions must largely remain unanswered, but it might be
hypothesized that the Malthusian underpinnings of the crisis position
comes closest to a reasonable answer. Malthus, writing in 1798, reasoned
food
that in human society two indisputable variables were operant:
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increases in an arithmetic ratio (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) while population
increases in a geometric ratio (e.g., 1, 2, 4, 8, 16). Hence while the
number of mouths grows geometrically, cultivable land grows only
arithmetically. The result is inevitable and logical: the number of
people is bound to outstrip the amount of food in a given population.

Yet even though Malthus' theory has been demonstrated to be
incorrect--primarily because the pace of urbanization and industrialization since 1798 have circumvented his paradox--it still remains extremely
powerful in the United States. Americans, just as did Malthus, tend to
see the source of all human poverty and misery in individual inadequacies. Hence, the problems which beset American society--whether they
be crime, alienation, or poverty--are consistently and incorrectly
associated with population growth. If only the individual would control
the size of his progeny, then society would see the slow dissolution of
its problems--so say the neo-Malthusians. Their pessimism is always
associated with a profound sense of utopian idealism. Hence, solutions
must always be personal and for this reason neo-Malthusians have a great
deal of difficulty in examining other approaches on population questions.
This is particularly true of other positions such as the Marxian position
and the Roman Catholic position--both of which are diametrically opposed
to each other in their principal assumptions, but both of which see
economic and social justice as the solution to population "problems."
Neo-Malthusians cannot understand these other stances since they are
unable to break away from the land-people ratio relationship inherent in
Malthus' argument.
Implications for Social Welfare
The data which have been cited in Table 1-6 have obvious policy
implications for the field of social welfare since they suggest a
rapidly changing demographic situation within the United States. As such,
the social welfare professions should put their human and economic
resources "where the action is." This action will presumably entail the
shifting of emphasis from former needs to new evolving needs. Yet what
will these future human needs entail?
To answer this we might look at the major age distributions of our
population and, in so doing, divide them demographically into their three
major component parts: dependent children population (ages 0-15 years),
active adult population (ages 15-64) and dependent aged population (65+).
The transition from a relatively high birth rate to a lower one in the
past 15 years, and short-range projections of an even lower birth rate
than the present one--each of these factors implies that the dependent
children grouping will be relatively less important than the active adult
and dependent aged categories. This is already apparent in 1974 where
the impact of the declining fertility rate has been strongly felt in
elementary school enrollments, teacher training programs, child adoption
services and dozens of similar programs geared towards service to youth.
It will become more apparent as the low birth rate cohort of the late
1960s and early 1970s age and approach adolescence. Here demographic
projections indicate a declining high school enrollment and eventually
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a fairly pronounced negative impact on college enrollments. Similarly
adolescent service units will be affected as they experience a declining
'clientele,"a decline which may have little to do with the type and
extent of service which they offer to adolescents!
These changes may not necessarily be negative changes since a good
portion of social welfare service programs have been traditionally overwhelmed by the enormity of the needs of their respective client
populations. With a projected decline in the number of childre for
example, the typical family service agency, child guidance clinic,
pre-school nursery program, etc. should be enabled to provide more
extensive assistance to those in need. Assuming that the financial
support for these agencies remains relatively constant, and the clientele
diminishes, the resultant professional attention to that clientele should
be maximized. Such an assumption of financial stability might be outside the control of the respective agencies, however!
An analysis of the second grouping, the active age population,
suggests the continued increase in its number. Since its members are
already present in American society, and since migration to and from the
nation is relatively small, the forecast for this group is somewhat
simplified. As the baby-boom children mature, they will demand services
which are geared toward their needs. In 1974, the entire baby boom is
in the active adult grouping. As such, they will need everything from
employment to additional ski resorts! The bulk of this age cohort
15 entering the post-college age brackets. Their employment possibilities are dimmed somewhat since so many of them have been seeking
positions which traditionally have been hard to fill. Hence, for
example, there is presently a glut of newly trained elementary school
teachers seeking teaching positions in schools beset with declining
enrollments; the social work profession will increasingly feel this
pressure as young adults previously geared to teaching begin to seek
positions in social service agencies.
As this competetition continues
and even increases, it is conceivable that certain groups (e.g., ethnic
and social minority) will be at an even greater disadvantage than at
present. Because of supply and demand considerations, those better
equipped in terms of education, family background, etc. will be in a
better position for the ensuing competition.
Those adult-age individuals at the higher ages in this category
(e.g., 35+) will presumably be at less of a disadvantage. Since much
of America's employment pattern is based on some system of seniority,
this group may be "locked in" secure positions, from which they can
conceivably immunize themselves from the increasing competition of their
younger colleagues. Yet this advantage may be short-lived since the
tension between the two groups may necessarily resolve itself in things
such as early retirement, periodic review of job abilities, shorter work
weeks for the older workers, etc. Those units within the social welfare
profession specifically relating to employment policy, trade unionization policy, guaranteed annual income policy, and minority hiring policy
should be alerted to these future possibilities.
-17F--

The third grouping, the dependent aged population, represents
the area which should have the greatest future need, and therefore the
greatest attention from the social welfare field. Since the number of
aged is presently increasing both in relative and absolute terms, the
profession should immediately initiate programs geared toward the
needs of the aged. These programs will involve a greater emphasis on
senior citizen clubs, higher social security payments, more adequate
medical and dental care, better nursing home facilities, etc. Also,
the changing demographic picture will necessitate the profession's
providing consideration to those dependent aged not serviced by nursing
facilities, senior citizen clubs. Careful provision must be made for
the group so that its needs are met. Also to be considered is the
differential life expectancies of males and females. In 1971, the
average life expectancy for males was 67.4 years, while for females the
expectancy was 74.9 years. (Social Indicators, 1973:Table 1) Consequently, there will be, as there now are, an absolute "excess" of
females at the higher age brackets. How will they be provided for?
How will the increasing difficulty of loneliness resulting from the
death of a husband be handled? Will facilities for the aged be able to
handle the unbalanced sex ratio wherein male residents become something
of an oddity? Again these are current problems, and their severity can
only increase in future years.
In substance, the social welfare professions should be primarily
prepared to gear their programs towards the active adult and dependent
aged populations. This presumably will entail less of a proportional
emphasis on the needs of youth in the dependent children population
category. While these latter needs are great, there should be a
relaxing of the strains among the dependent youth in years to come.
Secondly, the profession as a whole should be somewhat suspicious
of the claims of the advocates of a population explosion here in America.
Granted it is difficult for a profession which is comprised of so many
different constituencies to take such a stance, either pro or con;
however, when various vested interest groups begin to translate slogans
such as "stop at two," or "none is fun" into a call for legislative
curtailment of large families, then the profession, or sizable segments
of it, will be compelled to take a position; when various demographic
crisis groups argue that we'll starve if we don't stop at two children
and that as a consequence we must adopt everything from abortion on
demand, to euthanasia, then social welfare professions should have
enough intellectual integrity to question the underlying fallacies
inherent in such statements.
It might be noted in passing that numerous bills have been
introduced in both Congress and state legislatures relating to population
control. For example, in Hawaii a bill was introduced in the state
legislature requiring the sterilization of every women giving birth to
her second child. In addition there is the perennial question of
mandatory contraception or sterilization of those too poor to support
their families. (Dillon, 1972:3)
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In 1973 the Alabama legislature passed a law permitting the
sterilization of mental patients with their consent or with the consent
of the institution's administration if the individual is incompetent to
make such a decision. We should note that a similar measure was introduced in Nazi Germany under Reichfuhrer RUdin whereby all schizophrenic,
manic-depressive, feeble-minded patients etc. were to be sterilized by
surgical operation. This sterilization law was enacted in 1933, and by
1936, the famous "Nuremberg Laws" were in full force, paving the way for
the "legal" elimination of Jews, Gypsies, and other "non-Aryan" groups.
Where will social welfare professionals stand on these issues? If the
majority of the profession is convinced that America faces a genuine
demographic crisis simply because of the rhetoric of the prophets of
doom, then it will be difficult for this number not to support these
proposals.
Hopefully this analysis has aired the other side of the argument
currently voiced in both academic and non-academic circles. Population
questions are intricately related to space, sustenance, technology and
social organization and by attempting to interrelate these factors, the
authors hope that they may have minimally assisted the profession in
examining the myth, rather than the reality, of a population explosion
in the United States.
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